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Project Mercury, our initial man-in-space program,
represented a "venture" in every sense of the word.
It was an undertaking which was definitely speculative
in the opinion of many people. Manned space flight
_/ ventured forth into a new and unknown physical en-
vironment, intellectually into new technologies of en-
gineering and management, and sociologically into a
new concept of large-size governmental support of
technical development in peacetime without the im-
petus of war or defense.
It is difficult to discuss the venture of man into
space because of the interrelationships of the three
types of venturing noted above and because of the
concurrent nature of the approaches to the many prob-
lems which faced us in this program. This is a re-
_i view of part of the sociological or political dimate
that led to the decision to undertake the project, the
technological background that permitted us to under-
take it, and the problems that we faced in accomplish-
ing the Nation's initial steps in manned space flight.
SOCIOLOGICAL CLIMATE
The United States has historically been in a position
of leadership in all types of exploration, and the
American people as a group have always had a com-
petitive nature. With the advent of plans for the
International Geophysical Year the exploratory and
competitive nature of this country led to our planning
to launch a small instrumented Earth satellite in order
to derive the greatest benefit from this proposed
period of new scientific exploration.
The previous leadership of the United States in the
field of aviation has been based on continual research
and development of means for flying higher, faster,
and farther. It seemed only natural to many of us
to extend this experience in manned aircraft flight into
manned space flight as the next step in the "higher-
faster.farther"_:game.
The relatively unexpected flight of the Soviet
Sputnik on October 4, t957, really sparked the com-
petitive spirit of the Nation. Many groups advanced
plans for regaining what appeared to be a loss of
national prestige and a loss of our position of world
leadership in science and technology. Consideration
of these various proposals led the national adminis-
tration and the Congress to embark on a new era in
Federal support of technology. It was determined that
the survival of this Nation in the present "Technolog-
ical Age" depended upon the establishment of a broad
capability in engineering and science and that a pro-
gram of space exploration with relatively large-scale
support by the Federal Government was a suitable
focal point for this development of capability.
The passage of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958, which established the NASA, was the
first major step in this new venture of government
into the large-scale development of technology in
peacetime. Since this was a first step in a new venture,
there were many questions upon which many individ-
uals and groups held opinions but for which no one
really knew the answer. Among these questions were:
(1) Just how large should be the Government's
investment in such a speculative undertaking ?
(2) What should be the division of effort be-
tween the manned and unmanned phases of this
exploration ?
(3) What should be the division of effort be.
tween the peaceful and the military or defense
aspects of the program?
In the area of financial support, the space program
started small in order to minimize the risk of potential
waste. The support was built up as we learned what
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was needed, and it now appears to be approaching
a leveling-off point. In the areas of "peaceful vs.
military" and "manned vs. unmanned" efforts the
problems, and the answers, have been rather inter-
twined. Since the capabilities of man in a space-flight
environment were unknown, it appeared wise to
devote part of the peaceful program to a determination
of these capabilities before embarking on a military
program to utilize these capabilities for national
defense. In the unmanned program the differences
between the civilian scientific and military defense
applications were not easily visualized, and thus
simultaneous "peaceful" and "military" programs were
undertaken. The result of our experience has led us
to a situation at present where the answers seem to be,
as shown in figure 1 :
(1) The total financial support is leveling off at
about 7.5 to 8 billion dollars per year, just over
1 percent of our gross national product.
(2) The manned program is receiving about one-
half of the total support.
(3) The civilian and military share about equally
in the unmanned effort, and a military-manned
program now seems to be getting underway.
GROSSNATIONAL PRODUCT 607 BILLION
TOTALSPACE BUDGET 7.0 BILLION
[] MANNED
[] UNMANNED
FIGURE 1.--Space budget for fiscal year 1964.
Thus we can see that the past 6 years of experience
have developed partial answers to these questions, but
the inherent lack of answers in the early days of the
program did pose problems.
TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Figure 2 shows a general outline of the develop-
ment of the technological background that made it
possible for this country to undertake a manned space-
flight program. The research and development capac-
ity of this country during the past several decades has
lain in the basic research establishments like NACA
and the universities, in the armed services, and in the
industry. The primary contributions of each of these
elements is listed on the left in figure 2. The appli-
cation of these contributions was, up until 1958,
devoted primarily to two areas: aircraft and missiles.
The development of these two classes of vehicles
produced technical knowledge in the disciplines shown
in the center of figure 2. As indicated in the figure,
the combined knowledge in these two areas resulted
in the overall technical basis for manned space flight.
Some of the more specific items in this buildup of
capability indicate some of the problems we faced.
REENTRY HEATING
One of the major new problems posed by the
missile and space age was that of thermal protection of
a vehicle during its reentry into the atmosphere from
the high altitudes and high speeds associated with
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. H. J. Allen
of the NACA Ames Aeronautical Laboratory proposed
that the basic answer to this question lay in the use of
very blunt high-drag reentry bodies. With such
bodies most of the high kinetic and Potential energy
could be dissipated in the form of shock-wave drag,
which heats the air, and only a small fraction is dis-
sipated as skin-friction drag, which heats the body.
Various proposals were advanced for coping with
the amount of heat that could go into the body.
Among these were (1) the use of heat sinks, wherein
the body material has a high enough heat capacity to
absorb the thermal energy without melting; (2) the
use of transpiration cooling, wherein a liquid or gas
is ejected from the body into the boundary layer to
prevent much of the heat from entering the body;
and (3) the use of ablation, wherein the melting or
decomposition of a thin layer of the body surface
absorbs heat (as does the heat sink) and also the
molten or decomposed material flows into the
boundary layer and blocks part of the heat (as does
transpiration cooling). The first and third methods
were developed in ground and flight tests by the Air
Force and the Army, and by the time Project Mercury
was ready for serious consideration, the feasibility of
both methods had been demonstrated.
The remaining questions then concerned such mat-
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FIGURE Z--Spacecraft development.
ters as material selection, fabrication techniques, struc-
tural design techniques, and weight trade-offs. These
were answered by the design and development phases
of Project Mercury.
REENTRY LOADS
Another example of technological problems of
early manned space-flight planning is the question of
reentry loads. Some of the first studies made in this
area were based on a ground rule that the pilot should
never be subjected to more than 12g of acceleration.
This was based on aircraft flight experience with
seated pilots. The earliest solution proposed was to
use a lifting reentry body, which would inher6ntly
be heavier than a ballistic body and would thus
require either that an extra stage of propulsion be
added to the Atlas ICBM or that the program be
delayed until a more powerful launch vehicle became
available. The final solution, the one actually used
in Mercury, was to use the Faget contoured couch
which permitted the pilot to withstand safely the
higher loads inherent in the ballistic design.
PROGRAM HISTORY
Preapproval Era
Prior to October 1958, when Project Mercury was
officially started, a great deal of study effort was ex-
pended by various groups to define an adequate first
step in a manned-space-flight program. Concurrent
and independent (but coordinated) studies by the
NACA, Air Force, Army, Navy, and ARPA culmi-
nated in the formation of a Joint Manned Satellite
Panel by NACA and ARPA in the fall of 1958. This
panel collected the results of the various studies and
proposed to the Director of ARPA and the newly
appointed Administrator of NASA a program that
was accepted and approved in early October 1958.
The program was as follows.
The initial approach to manned space flight should
have two major objectives:
(1) Achieve manned Earth-orbital flight and re-
cover,/.
(2) Determine man's capabilities in a space-flight
environment and in those environments to which he
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would be subject upon going into and returning 
from space. 
These basic principles should be adhered to in the 
(1) The simplest and most reliable approach 
(2) A minimum of new developments 
(3) A progressive buildup of tests 
The basic method for accomplishing the project 
(1) A high-drag reentry vehicle 
(2) An ICBM for the launch vehicle 
(3) Retrorodtets for initiating reentry 
(4) A parachute descent after reentry 
(5) An escape system to remove the Spacecraft 
from the vicinity of a malfunctioning launch 
vehicle. 
The above basic objectives, principles, and method 
initially established for Project Mercury have re- 
mained essentially unchanged throughout the life of 
the project. 
project. These were the use of: 
should be the use of: 
Immediate Postapproval Era 
On October 7, 1958, we were faced with an enor- 
mous task for which we were fairly well prepared 
technologically but relatively unprepared in organita- 
tion, management, funding, schedule, and policy. We  
thus had to face immediately the problems in these 
many areas as well as the detailed technical problems. 
Because of the unsettled nature of national policy 
during the year between Sputnik I and the official 
start of Mercury, the funds available for beginning 
such a program were limited. However, we were able 
to begin. Upon approval of the program, a multi- 
pronged effort began to: 
(1) Define spacecraft specifications 
(2)  Select a spacecraft contractor 
(3) Define launch-vehicle requirements 
(4) Arrange for the launch vehicles to be supplied 
(Atlas by USAF, Redstone by Army, and Little 
Joe by NASA; see fig. 3) 
FIGURE 3.-Project Mercury launch vehicles. 
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(5) Build up a management organization
(6) Define mission and network requirements
(7) Select and train astronauts
Manufacturing and Development Period
The first year of the program, which covered the
immediate postapproval era and the first half-year of
the manufacturing and development period, saw the
buildup of a management staff and the outlining of
program, schedule, and budget through better defini-
tion of the job to be accomplished. The program
was well enough defined by early in 1960 to allow
estimates of cost and schedule that were very close
to the final numbers.
The second year of the program, 1960, saw the
appearance and solution of many of the technical
hardware problems in the spacecraft and launch-
vehicle systems. These problems appeared when
detailed design, manufacturing, and test efforts showed
that the state of the art in many systems such as
parachutes, electrical power systems, electronics and
so on, had not advanced as much as we had hoped.
In fact, this advancement of the state of technology
is one of the primary reasons for the whole space
program--simply the need to make this Nation strong
in all ways.
This second year of Project Mercury also saw the
development of a set of functional relationships
among the various Government and industry groups
involved in Mercury. These relationships are shown
in figure 4. This chart illustrates the complex nature
of such a program and the large number of diverse
groups whose talents must be drawn together to carry
out successfully a manned space flight. These rela-
tionships have evolved and changed in detail during
the past several years, but the basic pattern and spirit
of cooperation have remained.
Program Growth Period
The birth of the present manned-lunar-landing
program was another product of the 1960-61 period.
I
DIRECTOR SPACE
FLIGHT PROGRAMS
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FIGURe 4._Project Mercury functional relationships.
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A study directed toward establishing our next major 
goals in manned space flight beyond Mercury indi- 
cated that a system which included a small Earth- 
orbiting laboratory and which was capable of circum- 
lunar flight represented a step that was both significant 
and within the expected rate of development of our 
technology. During 1960 a research program was 
undertaken within NASA, and a design study and 
development program was started within industry, to 
better define the Apollo system and its capabilities. 
Following Alan Shepard’s flight on the Mercury- 
Redstone, the decision was made that the Apollo 
program would be focused on a manned lunar landing 
and return within the decade. Other events of the 
year were the decision to undertake Project &mini 
as a step between Projects Mercury and Apollo. 
Apollo, which will be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent papers, requires a really major step beyond 
Mercury in manned-space-flight technology. Require- 
ments for mission control are as follows: 
Mercury Apollo 
Up to 1 -day 
N o  maneuvering Maneuvering 
Near-Earth tracking Near-Earth and deep- 
Simple computing Complex computing 
Ballistic reentry Reentry control 
Recovery control Recovery control 
Training Training 
There is a marked increase in flight duration, maneu- 
vering in space, more complex tracking and comput- 
ing, and reentry control of a maneuverable spacecraft. 
All of these differences are accompanied by more 
complex spacecraft systems and hardware. The size 
of this step is a basic reason for the Gemini Project. 
Gemini will give us an intermediate task upon which 
we can focus to gain lead time in many of these 
technical areas. The Gemini spacecraft, for example, 
is larger than the Mercury (fig. 5) in order to carry 
two men and extra supplies to allow us to gain expe- 
7 days 
space tracking 
FIGURE 5.-Comparison of manned spacecraft. 
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rience with long-duration flights. Like Apollo,
Gemini will have advanced navigation and control
equipment to permit both space and reentry maneu-
The Gemini mission objectives are as follows:
Preflight checkout techniques
Time-critical launch
Variable launch azimuth
Onboard guidance
In-flight maneuvering (rendezvous and dock-
vering.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
ing)
(6)
(7)
(S)
(9)
(lo)
Long-duration manned flights
Advanced ground-control techniques
Controlled lifting reentry
More complex recovery
Flight-crew training
(11) Ground-crew training
With Project Gemini we will be gaining experience
and developing technology that will apply to the
Apollo mission. The long-duration flights will give
us a chance to exercise men and equipment for long
periods of weightlessness in a space environment but
close enough to Earth for return, in an emergency,
within minutes or hours rather than days. The
rendezvous exercises will permit us to develop opti-
mum manual or automatic techniques of bringing
two spacecraft together before we are committed to
its actual use in the Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous.
The use of such advanced systems as hypergolic-fuel
reaction controls, onboard guidance computers, and
fuel-cell batteries will allow us to learn and solve the
problems with this type of equipment before the
Apollo preflight schedule becomes critical.
Like 1961, 1962 saw us engaged in many concur-
rent efforts:
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(1) The establishment of the Manned Spacecraft
Center in temporary quarters in Houston
(2) The design and start of construction of the
permanent Center facilities
(3) John Glenn's orbital flight, followed by those
of Carpenter and Schirra
(4) The selection of contractors for the Lunar
Excursion Module
(5) The various Saturn V stages
(6) The establishment of the Launch Operations
Center (now John F. Kennedy Space Center,
NASA) in Florida
(7) Continued design and falJrication of the
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space vehicles
Going on into 1963, the fifth year, we saw the
completion of Project Mercury with Gordon Cooper's
highly successful 22-orbit flight, the continuation of
detailed design, development, and fabrication efforts
on Apollo hardware, and the extremely satisfactory
series of successful flights of the Saturn I vehicle
which will be used in early Apollo development
flight tests and which has laid the groundwork for
the design concepts of the Saturn V.
This year of 1964 has begun well. We have made
our major move into the new Manned Spacecraft
Center facilities; we have made a successful first flight
of the Gemini space vehicle; the design of the Lunar
Excursion Module has been established; and signifi*
cant progress has been made in both the design,
development, and fabrication of the Apollo space-
vehicle system and in the ground facilities in Missis-
sippi and Florida. We are looking forward to further
flights of the Gemini this year and to an important
series of flight tests of Apollo spacecraft and Saturn
hardware during the year.
